Acquittal: The role of the investigating officer is to collect evidence and not to create one further blood stains of the accused need not be the ones spilt on that fateful day may be from before

THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH VERSUS ANCHLA @ CHANCHLA – CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 166 of 2019 – 2026 INSC 1074 – October 01, 2026 – MANOJ MISRA, VIJAY BISHNOI

https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2015/4240/4240_2015_9_1501_74862_Judgement_01-Oct-2026.pdf

Appellant and impugned order challenged

The appellant is the State of Himachal Pradesh challenging the High Court judgment dated July 28, 2014, which allowed the appeal of the respondent-accused and set aside the trial court’s order dated November 7, 2012, that had convicted and sentenced the respondent under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. [para 1]

Factual matrix

The bodies of a woman and her minor son were discovered in their locked house, approximately a week after they were allegedly murdered by strangulation. The stepdaughter of the deceased woman became the prime suspect based on the theory that she was last seen with them, had hired a taxi to the location, possessed a bleeding thumb injury matching blood at the scene, and allegedly held keys to the locked house. The prosecution’s case rested entirely on compiling these circumstantial pieces of evidence to prove she committed the murders for property gains. [paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 8]

Other courts verdicts

The Trial Court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence, concluding that the chain of events unerringly pointed towards her guilt and ruled out all other hypotheses. The High Court reversed this conviction and acquitted the accused, finding the motive unproved, the last seen evidence unconvincing, witness testimonies doubtful, and the DNA evidence inconclusive due to potential evidence planting. [paras 11, 12, 17]

Core legal arguments of appellant vs respondent

The appellant argued that the High Court unlawfully discarded critical evidence on conjectures, contending that the matched DNA profile and the accused’s bleeding injury, alongside witness testimonies of taxi travel and last seen circumstances, formed an unbroken chain of guilt. Conversely, the respondent contended that the last seen evidence was inherently weak due to the long time gap before the body’s discovery, that key witness testimonies were artificially created, and the recovery of keys and mobile was unnatural and uncorroborated, thereby failing to elevate the case from mere suspicion to proof beyond reasonable doubt. [paras 19, 20]

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that in an appeal against acquittal based on circumstantial evidence, the appellate court should only interfere if the lower court’s view is perverse or ignores incontrovertible evidence. The Court found the prosecution failed to prove the last seen circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, discredited the taxi driver and hotel worker’s testimonies as untrustworthy, highlighted severe investigational lapses in securing mobile Call Detail Records with tower locations, and concluded the DNA evidence was not absolute proof of guilt for the specific date of the crime, thus failing to establish a complete chain of circumstances. [paras 25, 27, 50, 54, 83]

Directions issued

None.

Important paragraph

Scope of an appeal against acquittal

Difference between appeal against acquittal and conviction is explained

22. A judgement of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment under appeal is contrary to the evidence or palpably erroneous or takes a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction, keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court is reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal. Normally, an appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from an appeal against conviction. Whenever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, otherwise such interference is not called for. Therefore, if the view taken by the High Court is one of the views possible, or there appears no perversity in its reasoning and evaluation of evidence, merely because another view is possible, the order of acquittal does not call for interference.

Appreciation of appeal against an order of acquittal is if there are two views are possible on which favours the accused should be adopted

23. However, there is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal is not to be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is strengthened by acquittal. The general principle is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offense or not. The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only where there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is unreasonable, particularly where relevant and convincing evidence(s) have been unjustifiably discarded, it becomes a compelling reason for interference.

Scope of an appeal against acquittal

22. A judgement of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment under appeal is contrary to the evidence or palpably erroneous or takes a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction, keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court is reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal. Normally, an appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from an appeal against conviction. Whenever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, otherwise such interference is not called for. Therefore, if the view taken by the High Court is one of the views possible, or there appears no perversity in its reasoning and evaluation of evidence, merely because another view is possible, the order of acquittal does not call for interference.

23. However, there is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal is not to be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is strengthened by acquittal. The general principle is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offense or not. The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only where there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is unreasonable, particularly where relevant and convincing evidence(s) have been unjustifiably discarded, it becomes a compelling reason for interference.

Judgment reference on appreciation of appeal from an order of acquittal

24. In Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another, a three-Judge Bench of this Court after considering a number of decisions summarised the circumstances under which this court may entertain an appeal from an order of acquittal, and also when it may interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

“31.1. Ordinarily, this court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of equity which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal.

31.2. However, this court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows:

31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse:

(a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning.

(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses.

(c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter.

(d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime.

(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner.

(f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; or where acquittal rests merely in exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt in favor of the accused.

(g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it unnecessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”.

31.2.2. Where acquittal would result in gross miscarriage of justice:

(a) where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy.

(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature.

Circumstantial evidence and its appreciation

27. Before we proceed to closely scrutinize the evidence we must remind ourselves that the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. It is well settled that where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Besides, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of circumstances so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been committed by the accused.

29. We shall now consider whether the above circumstances were proved beyond reasonable doubt? If so, whether they were of conclusive nature and tendency? And whether they constituted a chain so far complete as to exclude all hypothesis save and except the one pointing towards the guilt of the accused?

Homicidal death confirmed: 30. To prove the charge of murder, first it has to be proved that the deceased died a homicidal death. Here, PW-7, i.e., the doctor, who conducted the autopsy of the bodies of D-1 and D-2 not only proved the autopsy reports but also substantiated that death of the two deceased was a consequence of asphyxia due to antemortem strangulation. There appears no reason to doubt the doctor’s statement that the two deceased died a homicidal death.

31. However, what is important is that autopsy was conducted on 08.09.2011 and in the opinion of the doctor, the death had occurred any time between 5-7 days before. In such circumstances, the possibility of death occurring even after 01.09.2011 is not ruled out.

Appreciation of Witness

PW.1 omitted important facts in his previous statement and improvised in his testimony: 35. What is clear from PW-1’s deposition is that on 31.08.2011 he had not interacted with the accused. Besides, his statement that he saw the accused talking to D-2 at D-1’s house is an improvement on his previous statement where he had omitted to make any such disclosure. What is also important is that in his previous statement he had disclosed that from outside of D-1’s house he had enquired from D-1 as to who would be staying with her that night and that D-1 had responded from inside the house about the accused staying with her that night. The discrepancy between his previous statement and deposition in Court indicates that PW-1 has improved upon his earlier statement. In our view, therefore, on the sole basis of PW-1’s testimony it would be unsafe to hold that the accused was with the deceased in the evening of 31.08.2011. In such circumstances, we would have to look at other evidences for corroboration. The other evidence which the prosecution has produced to show the presence of the accused at Diur in the evening of 31.08.2011 comes from PW-4, a taxi driver. PW-18, a worker at a Hotel in Chamba, has been produced to corroborate PW-4. We shall now consider their testimonies.

40. Whether the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-8 are to be accepted depends on their credibility/ trustworthiness. In our view, there are certain circumstances which dent their credibility. First, there is no indication in the testimony of the investigating officer (PW-20) as to what prompted him to record statement of PW-4 and PW-18. Second, PW-20 despite repeated questions did not tell the date when statements of PW-4 and PW-18 were recorded. How those two circumstances are relevant to doubt the credibility of PW-4 and PW-18 is discussed below.

Supreme Court explained the thinking of trained judicial mind in identifying natural witness: 41. To a lay man, the above circumstances may appear irrelevant in assessing credibility/ trustworthiness of a witness. But to a trained judicial mind it is an important circumstance in assessing whether a person is a natural witness, who is aware of relevant facts, or is the one who has been set up to create evidence. Normally, when a person is aware about a crime and has knowledge of any circumstance which, to his understanding, is incriminating in nature and may be of help to the police, he may, as a responsible person of the society, provide information to the police. But where the circumstance, of which one has knowledge or awareness, in itself is not one which could be considered incriminating or relevant for investigation of a crime, there is no likelihood of that person reporting it to the police. Therefore, the answer to the question as to why, when and in what circumstances the witness statement was recorded during investigation becomes an important tool in assessing the credibility of that witness. The reason is simple. Because the answer would help in determining whether the witness is a natural one or has been set up to create evidence.

Creating the evidence: 42. It is well settled that the role of the investigating officer is to collect evidence and not to create one. Where there is no occasion for the investigating officer to record statement of a person, or for that person to impart information to the police, yet, the police proceeds to record his statement without narrating the circumstance in which it was considered necessary to record his statement, a serious doubt arises as to whether that witness has been set up to create evidence.

Recording of corroborative witness (how to prove res gestae) example given: 43. We have no doubt in our mind that an investigating officer may pick up clues from any statement recorded during investigation to record statement of another. Such an exercise is completely bona fide. For example, if after recording statement of A, the investigating officer comes to know that B may have knowledge of something relevant, he would be justified in recording statement of B. But if the investigating officer straightway records statement of B, and there is no palpable reason for him to believe that B is possessed of relevant information, and B has no reason to impart information on his own to the investigating officer, a suspicion would arise whether the exercise of recording statement of B is undertaken just to create evidence. Lack of explanation in that regard may dent the credibility of B.

What witnesses the I.O to collect explained: 44. Ordinarily an investigating officer collects evidence from witnesses who are either present at the scene of crime or are likely to be aware of the crime and have information about it. Evidence may also be collected from persons who, by virtue of their relationship with the victim or the named accused, are likely to have relevant information. Investigation may also reach out to those who may be in contact with the victim, or the known accused, based on Call Detail Record (CDR) of the mobile of the victim or the suspects. Likewise, information may be collected on the basis of information received through disclosure statement suffered by the accused. However, where a person is not even aware that the information which he is possessed of is incriminating against some person, there is no likelihood of that person reporting that information to the police. In such circumstances, what propels the investigating officer to record his statement becomes important, and failure to disclose the reason may dent the credibility of that witness as it may reasonably be inferred that the said witness is one who has been set up.

45. In the present case, PW-20 i.e., the investigating officer ducks the question and feigns ignorance as to when he recorded the statement of PW-4 and PW-18 during investigation. Further, there is no explanation as to what prompted him to record statements of PW-4 and PW-18 during investigation. Importantly, PW-20 does not state that in her disclosure statement the accused had disclosed about travelling by Taxi from Chamba to Diur and back or about her stay at the hotel. PW-20 only states that the accused in her disclosure had stated that she could get the keys and mobile recovered. Thus, statements of PW-4 and PW-18 appear to have been recorded only to create evidence.

46. Importantly, PW-1 does not state that he saw the accused coming to the house of the deceased in a taxi. Therefore, what prompted the investigating officer to record the statement of PW-4 is a mystery. Possibility of PW-4 on his own going to the police and getting his statement recorded is remote because travelling in a taxi, or staying in a hotel, by itself is not an incriminating circumstance as to disturb a person and prompt him to report it to the police. Therefore, what prompted the investigating officer to record statements of PW-4 and PW-8 assumes importance, and lack of disclosure/ explanation in that regard, in our view, is sufficient to consider them as witnesses set up to create evidence for constituting a chain of circumstances.

Record of stay of accused in hotel not proved: 49. Insofar as PW-18 is concerned, he candidly admitted that record of accused’s stay at that hotel was not handed over to the police. Lack of record of her stay seriously dents the credibility of his statement because it is a matter of common knowledge that all hotels / Sarai, in ordinary course of business, are required to maintain guest record/register. Absence of such corroborative evidence of stay, seriously impairs the credibility of PW-18.

50. For all the reasons above, we are of the view that statements of PW-4 and PW-18 are not trustworthy and unworthy to serve as corroborative piece of evidence of the last seen circumstance narrated by PW-1.

Appreciation of Circumstantial evidence

Keys and lock should be matched: 58. The circumstance of recovery of key(s) at the instance of the accused would be relevant only if it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the lock which had to be broken to gain access to the room where the bodies were lying was the one which was seized and sent to the laboratory to ascertain whether those keys operated on that lock.

59. Thus, the prosecution had to prove (a) that the door of D-1’s house was locked, and (b) it was locked by the same lock of which keys were discovered at the instance of the accused.

60. In this regard, PW-1, who has been examined apart from others, though states that the door of D-1’s house was locked, is neither a witness to the seizure memorandum of the lock nor he describes the lock with which the door was locked.

64. Interestingly, PW-20, the investigating officer is not even a witness of breaking of the lock. PW-20 states as under:

“By the time, I had reached the spot, the lock on the main door had already been broken open by the police team present at the spot.”

65. Having regard to the above evidence, we are of the view that it was not established beyond reasonable doubt that the lock which was broken to gain entry to D-1’s house and the lock which was sent for forensic examination and produced in Court, was one and the same. We say so because PW-3 who identified the lock in court did not say that it locked the latch that shut the door of D-1’s house, and PW-15, who is witness to the lock breaking process, does not identify the lock produced in Court as the one which locked the door. Once that is the position, the recovery of keys at the instance of the accused-respondent is rendered inconsequential. More so, when the recovery has been denied by the accused in her statement under Section 313 CrPC. The High Court was therefore justified in concluding that in the absence of clear and cogent evidence, that it was this very lock that had locked the latch which shut the door, and had to be broken to gain access to D-1’s house, the discovery of keys is inconsequential.

Recovery of keys is artificial: 66. Besides above, it does not appeal to reason as to why the accused would take away the keys of the lock with her, or for that matter why would she even lock the door, when she resided at another place. This recovery, therefore, appears artificial and does not inspire confidence.

Recovery of the mobile from the accused’s house is rejected since IO did not collect CDR: 67. The other incriminating circumstance is regarding the recovery of mobile of the deceased from the house of the accused. This circumstance is denied by the accused. In our view, it has been rendered doubtful for multiple reasons. Firstly, the investigating officer has not got CDR of the said mobile exhibited in evidence. Further, the investigating officer (PW-20) is silent on as to whether (a) mobile was switched off or not on 01.09.2011; if not, whether it received any call on 01.09.2011, or later; and (b) if it had received a call, where it was located. Secondly, a mobile can always be planted by picking it from the scene of crime and putting it at the place from where recovery is to be shown. Therefore, to remove all doubts, the investigating officer ought to have placed the complete CDR of the mobile along with its tower location. Thirdly, why would the accused carry the mobile from the house of the deceased to her own house when she has her own mobile. Rather, she would carry other valuables from the deceased’s house. At this stage, we may observe that there is no evidence that she carried any valuables from the house of the deceased to her own house.

68. In such circumstances, firstly, recovery of mobile from the accused’s house is doubtful and, secondly, in absence of the complete CDR of that mobile along with its tower location, its incriminatory value, if any, is seriously dented.

73. Admittedly, the scene of crime was first discovered on 07.09.2011. The testimony of the investigating officer (PW-20) discloses that he was a part of the FSL team which had lifted samples of blood from different points in the room where the deceased had been murdered. He states that the FSL team had visited on 10.09.2011 and had taken parts of mattresses, pillow cover, drugget and bedsheet into possession. A single bedsheet was also taken into possession. A cloth cover lying over a trunk was also taken into possession by the team. He stated that all the aforesaid articles were sealed in a cloth parcel. PW-20 also states that the FSL team had taken photographs of palm prints of the accused and had also sent them to fingerprint bureau Shimla for comparison. However, there appears no record of palm prints report. There is also no explanation as to why it was not produced. Interestingly, none of the members of the forensic team which collected the articles was examined. However, we do not propose to draw adverse inference on that count as there is not much cross-examination regarding it.

Scientific expert not called for cross-examination: 78. What is surprising is that all samples were found to have disintegrated save and except the scrape from the cabinet and the one lifted from the cabinet by cotton thread. Interestingly the control sample from the cabinet was not sent for forensic examination. Besides, if blood stains on all articles were collected on or about the same time, disintegration of other blood stains and non-disintegration of blood stain found at one spot is something which puzzles us. Unfortunately, the author of the report i.e., the scientific expert was not called for cross-examination, and there is not much effort from the defence to demonstrate that the seal of the articles dispatched was tampered with. In such view of the matter, though we have questions in our mind, we have no option but to accept the report as it stands. However, whether this circumstance clinches the case for the prosecution is what we shall now discuss.

Blood stains of the accused need not be the one spilled on that fateful day may be before: 79. Presence of blood of the accused in the room at best indicates that at some point in time the accused was present there. This does not indicate that the accused was present on 31.08.2011 or for that matter on any given date. Importantly, the prosecution case itself is that the accused had been visiting the house of the deceased regularly in the past. Probability of some injury in the past causing blood to spill on the cabinet is one possibility which cannot be ruled out. Besides, what is important is that the accused’s blood was not found on the clothes of the deceased or on any cloth or material which might have been used to strangulate the two deceased. In consequence, this circumstance, even if it is accepted as proven, is not conclusive of the accused being the perpetrator of the crime.

81. In cases of circumstantial evidence, the presence of a strong motive lends credence to the prosecution case, though, absence of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case. However, if the other circumstances are not conclusive or lack the requisite probative value to conclude that the accused is guilty, absence of motive becomes an important reason to give the benefit of doubt to the accused.

83. Having discussed all the incriminating circumstances, the summary of our analysis is as under:

(a) Death of the two deceased though was homicidal but whether death had occurred in the intervening night of 31.08.2011/ 01.09.2011 is not proved beyond doubt. Possibility of death occurring later, perhaps on 01.09.2011 or 02.09.2011 is not ruled out by the medical evidence.

(b) The accused being present in the house of D-1 on 31.08.2011 is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. PW-1, the witness of last seen circumstance, makes an improvement over his previous statement and is not wholly reliable. PW-4 and PW-18 are not credible witnesses hence they fail to corroborate the last seen circumstance narrated by PW-1.

(c) It is not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the lock which was produced in Court was the one that had locked the door of D-1’s house.

(d) Recovery of keys of the lock and the mobile of D-1, at the instance of the accused, does not inspire confidence, more so when there is an investigational lapse in obtaining the CDR with tower location of that mobile. Besides, CDR of D-1’s mobile was not exhibited.

(e) DNA matching of the profile generated from blood of the accused with the profile generated from the blood stained scrape collected from a cabinet placed in the room of D-1’s house is not conclusive about the accused being guilty of the crime as the accused had been a regular visitor to that house and, therefore, the presence of blood from before is not ruled out. Importantly, blood of the accused was not found present on the clothes of D-1 and D-2 or on the cloth with which D-1 and D-2 were allegedly strangulated.

(f) Suppression of CDR of D-1’s mobile and its tower location creates an impression that prosecution is suppressing vital information, as it would have helped in determining whether the deceased died on the date and time professed by the prosecution or any time later as also whether the accused and the deceased were at one place at any given point in time.

(g) In a nutshell, neither the incriminating circumstances were proved beyond reasonable doubt nor they constituted a chain so far complete as to exclude all hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused and point conclusively that it was the accused and no one else who, in all human probability, had committed the murders.

Conclusion

84. In conclusion, we have no hesitation in holding that the prosecution had failed to bring home the charge against the accused. Consequently, we find no reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Resources
Judgments Cited

• State of Rajasthan V. Shera Ram Alias Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602: Established that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal if two views are possible on the evidence.
• State of M.P. versus Bacchudas alias Balram and others, (2007) 9 SCC 135: Held that an appellate court must interfere only for compelling and substantial reasons.
• Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471: Summarized the precise circumstances under which an appeal against an order of acquittal may be entertained.
• Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 2 SCC 71: Laid down the foundational principles for assessing circumstantial evidence and the requirement of a complete chain.
• Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116: Reiterated the rule that circumstantial evidence must leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
• Acts and Sections Involved
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860
    • Section 302: Punishment for murder
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
    • Section 161: Examination of witnesses by police
    • Section 313: Power to examine the accused